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1 Thomas Hobbes in Edwin Curley, (ed.) Leviathan.
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), L.II.xx, 128-9.
Thomas Hobbes is an easy philosopher to hate. Hobbes built a theory of the political state that appears to deprive subjects of
their power and freedom, leaving them at the
mercy of a monstrously powerful sovereign.
Hobbes seems to reduce human reason to a mere
instrument – a means-ends calculator that allows
us to reckon the best means to achieve our self-
interested goals. Hobbes’ understanding of
human nature appears pessimistic in the extreme,
suggesting that cooperation between equals is
impossible without some coercive power. In a
redeeming moment, he gives women dominion
over children in the state of nature and argues
that women are not naturally under the power
of men; 1 but otherwise, Hobbes’ potential for
feminist theory seems fairly minimal. My aim in
this paper is to unseat some of these assumptions
about Hobbes by showing that much of what
feminist theorists have come to celebrate in
Spinoza is developed from Hobbesian conceptual
resources.  I will show that rather than diminish
human power Hobbes, like Spinoza, tries to
understand it. Hobbes’ naturalism and Spinoza’s
development of Hobbes’ naturalism is a powerful
asset for feminist theorists, to the extent that we
are interested in empowering women.
Empowering women has always been an
important if implicit goal of much feminist
philosophizing. Using various philosophical
traditions and methods, feminists work to
understand and critique those social categories,
norms and institutions that disempower women
and others through harmful ideas of gender,
sexuality and human nature. For many years
feminist philosophers have identified various
aspects of Descartes’ dualist picture of human
nature as harmful to women and have offered
a variety of critiques of Descartes’ mind-body
dualism and the rejection of the bodily passions
in favor of reason. This dualist conception of
human nature set mind above body and viewed
humans as essentially separate, ideally rational,
independent and free beings. This picture
clashed with women’s lived realities and
justified women’s unequal treatment as
associated with bodies, dependence and
emotion. This dualist picture of human nature
effectively excluded women.2
Recently, a group of feminist
philosophers has discovered in Spinoza a
fruitful source for an alternative picture of
human nature.3 Spinoza developed his positive
conception of human nature in opposition to
that of Descartes. Where Descartes’ subject is
essentially mind, Spinoza’s is part of nature,
and is therefore necessarily affected by the
forces of nature impinging upon it. Spinoza’s
positive conception of the human individual
forms the basis of his naturalistic social theory
that not only explains individuals’ strong
attachments to norms and identities that are
potentially disempowering, but also provides
counsel for reforming these norms and
identities through the reform of the affects and
2 Scheman (2001), Jaggar (1983), Lloyd (1984).
Although I agree that this is a bad picture of human
nature, I do not necessarily think it applies to
Descartes, but this is a subject for another paper.
3  This group includes Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd,
Heidi Ravven, Hasana Sharp, and Susan James.
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imagination.4 Feminist philosophers have
shown that Spinoza’s integrated naturalistic
understanding of human individuals and the
trans-individual character of emotions explains
how the power of an individual is increased or
decreased by the community of affects in which
an individual lives. However, the aspects of
Spinoza’s theory which feminists have found so
useful for projects of empowerment are in fact
the notions he developed from Hobbes.
Because of centuries of misconceptions
about Hobbes as a normative egoist, understanding
humans to be uniquely motivated by their self-
interest, we have missed important aspects of
Hobbes’ conception of the human emotions.5
When Hobbes’ contribution is recognized as the
foundation of the mature Spinozan picture of
the human individual we can make better sense
of how the affects can conflict within individuals
and how the internal emotional scales can be
tipped in favor of those affects which increase
our power. Hobbes provides not only the basis
for Spinoza’s conception of the human individual,
but his conception of the internal conflict of the
affects adds to Spinoza’s mature affect theory a
mechanism for understanding and overcoming
the difficulty of affective change.
Spinoza’s view suggests affective change
is needed for any social change, and that affective
change cannot be achieved without understanding
the body. Social categories, norms and practices
gain their power through individuals’ affective
attachment to them. If we want to reform one of
these categories, norms or practices, we need to
understand the affects that support them and
then to fight these affects. A dualist might say –
if these norms and categories are really bad, let’s
critique them and show that they are contrary to
reason. However, Spinoza and Hobbes argue that
this is not possible. Reason is relatively powerless
when it comes to the affects – alone, reason
cannot unseat the affects.6 The affective inertia
of the social norms through which we have come
to understand ourselves cannot be overcome by
critique or reason alone. Affects, Spinoza writes,
must be fought with affects. But how? One
promising possibility is the mechanism of the
internal ‘weighing’ of the affects suggested by
Hobbes.
When we see Hobbes through the lens of
his theory of the emotions and what Spinoza built
from these Hobbesian foundations, we can begin
to see a new Hobbes, one who cannot be accused
of ‘normative egoism’ or of a necessarily
pessimistic conception of human nature. Hobbes,
like Spinoza, understood humans as part of
nature, and as the building blocks of the state.
To understand how to create a legitimate and
stable state, both believed one must first
understand the parts that make it up – individual
humans and their emotions. Hobbes and Spinoza
developed models of human nature in order to
understand how to create a strong state where
the law could be most effectively enforced.
Although the idea of a ‘strong state’ and ensuring
obedience to the law may seem hopelessly out
of date and conservative at best, I will show that
for at least a subset of laws, namely those that
aim to empower women and those which
prohibit customs and practices which are harmful
to women, feminists need to understand what
can make these laws more effective. When we
properly understand the Hobbesian foundation
of Spinoza’s naturalistic picture of the human
individual and the state, then we can develop
effective tools for contemporary feminist projects
of empowerment.
TWO SENSES OF NATURAL
I have thus far proposed that feminist
philosophers have found Spinoza’s theory of the
affects and his conception of human power useful
to the extent that it conforms to the naturalistic
4  In this paper I will use the term ‘affects’ and ‘emotions’
interchangeably. The term affect is a technical term
for Spinoza, who distinguishes active and passive
affects in Book 3 of Spinoza’s Ethics. Here, what is
important is that emotions, on the view of Spinoza
and Hobbes, are caused by external forces affecting
our bodies, thus they are called ‘affects’. Hobbes
occasionally calls them ‘perturbations’ or ‘emotions’,
internal motions.
5  Sharon Lloyd argues that Hobbes cannot be conceived
as a normative egoist, though not for the reasons I
suggest. S.A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’
Leviathan. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992).
6  Spinoza, Ethics in Shirley, (ed.) Complete Works.
(Indianapolis: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
E4P7, 325-326.
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approach he shares with Hobbes. However, there
are doubtless many readers for whom
‘naturalism’ is nothing to be particularly excited
about, but rather a term that has worryingly
normative and exclusionary implications. I will
take a moment to explain the sense of naturalism
which characterizes Spinoza and Hobbes’
philosophies for the sake of clarification, but also
because doing so illuminates an important
motivation of Hobbes’ work. There are two senses
of ‘natural’ that I would like to distinguish.
NATURAL1
This first sense of ‘natural’ is the one in which
humans are understood as naturally sociable or
in Aristotle’s terms, ‘zoon politikon’.7 This
conception of humans as naturally social
supports the view society is natural; that is, that
social customs, hierarchy and inequality in the
family are ‘natural’. Hobbes wrote explicitly to
challenge this normative conception of humans
as ‘natural’.
NATURAL2
This is metaphysical naturalism or materialism,
which Hobbes supported. Hobbes explained
human action, science, causes and politics in
terms of matter and motion. This is the sense of
natural which Hobbes employs to explain the
political state through its component parts,
individual humans, who themselves are natural
beings made of matter and motions and who are
affected by the motions of matter of other
humans and of other parts of the natural world.
Hobbes wrote to undermine the Natural1
and to investigate Natural2. Hobbes believed that
if he explained the social world in terms of
naturalism2 he could destroy the illusions of
naturalism1. Hobbes argued against the view that
humans were sociable not because he thought
humans necessarily ‘evil’ or ‘bad’ or somehow
unfit for society. Rather, Hobbes believed that
humans can be both incredibly useful to one
another or they can be vicious. He wrote that
humans could be gods or wolves to one another,
helps or harms, depending on the circumstances.8
Human emotions can lead both to love and to
hate. The emotions, which Hobbes called
alternately perturbations and internal motions,
are natural forces.9 They can draw humans into
society and they can lead them to destroy it.
By critiquing this first sense of natural
with respect to human society, Hobbes opens up
the possibility of challenging those customs and
hierarchies that could not otherwise be
questioned. Against this feudal picture of united
peoples justly and hierarchically ordered by God,
Hobbes proposes that humans are naturally2
equal beings with equal ‘natural[2] right’ to
everything.10 Aristotle’s picture of a world where
some naturally lead and others naturally serve
was a truism of the political theories that Hobbes
sought to undermine. Recent attempts by
political theorists to resurrect Aristotelian politics
ignore the meaning that Aristotelian political
theory had in the 17th century. In Hobbes’ time,
Aristotelians argued that political societies were
natural1: peoples were naturally1 united,
benevolent and sociable. Even slavery (within
the family and without) was a natural1 feature
of human life. For Hobbes, all so-called natural1
hierarchies were the result of social conventions.
Social conventions, slavery, inequality in the
family and in social status are propped up by an
artificial power.
For Hobbes, the Reformation and the
bloody wars of religion that followed served as a
reductio of such Aristotelian faith in human
sociability, benevolence, and natural1 hierarchy.
The historian Christopher Hill has called the
period of the English Civil war one in which the
world was ‘turned upside down’.11 Religious,
economic and status hierarchies were challenged
in bloody battles throughout the wars of religion,
7 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive in Bernard Gert (Ed.), Man
and Citizen (De Cive and De Homine). (Indiannapolis,
IN: Hackett, 1991), D.Cv.,I.i, 110.
8  Hobbes, D.Cv., Dedication, 89.
9 Hobbes, De corpore politico, or, The elements of law,
moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads,
as of the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several
kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions
of them.
(London: Printed by T.R. for J. Ridley, 1652), Chapter
XXV.13.
10 Hobbes, L.I.xiii.[1-3], 110-111.
11 Christopher Hill, World Turned Upside Down: radical
ideas during the English Revolution. (London: Penguin
Books, 1991).
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the peasants’ wars, and the English Civil war.12
Martin Luther’s critique of the legitimacy of
Church hierarchy opened up questions of the
legitimacy of hierarchy of all kinds. Peasants
reading the Bible for the first time in their
vernacular argued that the priesthood was
universal. The Levellers in England argued for
universal suffrage, the Diggers for common
ownership of land. Even though the peasants
were massacred and the English crown
eventually restored, the idea that traditional
hierarchies were sufficiently natural so as to need
no justification was no longer tenable. For
Hobbes, a new political theory of the foundations
and legitimacy of the state was necessary.
The destructive wars caused by religious
division proved, for Hobbes, that humans are not
naturally sociable. The emotions that yield
sociability in some circumstances – for example,
love and devotion – can also lead to divisions
and war in other circumstances. The wars of
religion also taught Hobbes the important lesson
of security. Once the bonds of society and politics
were broken all hell seemed to break loose.
Within the midst of a violent and chaotic situation
nothing can really be done – no academic
research, no long-term projects, no real industry.
When one cannot count on the stability of the
state, only the barest form of life and survival
from moment-to-moment is possible. Life in such
a state is ‘nasty, brutish, and short’.13 So,
whatever form the new state would take, it would
need to be secured and stable in order to allow
any sort of flourishing.
Hobbes, as a proponent of the New
Science and the geometric method, believed that
in order to really understand something, one
needed to understand its parts and their manner
of organization.14 For Hobbes, the parts of the
state were the human individuals within it; their
manner of organization determined by their
‘motions’, that is, their ‘emotions’ or ‘perturbations’.
Hobbes sought to understand humans as natural2
beings; that is as bodies, affected by other bodies,
whose behavior could be understood by
understanding the internal and external motions
by which they are affected. We can understand
humans in terms of the emotions, those internal
motions that govern their conduct, and by
understanding the effects of external bodies on
those internal motions. Hobbes builds his entire
political theory on this naturalistic understanding
of human beings. Instead of assuming that
humans are naturally sociable and that
hierarchical divisions between them are
necessary, Hobbes believed that the only sure
way to build a secure state was by building it up
from its component parts – the individuals within
it – assuming no natural connections or
hierarchies. Hobbes’ great achievement in
political theory was building from this
naturalistic2 basis, from mere human individuals
and their emotions, desires, and a bit of reason,
a state that would secure them all.
THE MULTITUDE
Hobbes’ political philosophy began not
with an already-organized and allied society of
families, classes and social statuses, but with a
multitude of individuals.15 Unlike Locke, for
whom hierarchies of class and sex are natural
and so exist in his pre-political state of nature,
Hobbes proposed that all inequality was a result
of political agreement, convention. In the state
of nature, each individual was relatively equal
in intelligence and power. In this multitude of
individuals, each follows his or her appetites.
From this minimal set of assumptions, with no
requirement that the individuals involved share
similar interests, social, ethnic or familial ties,
Hobbes shows that the multitude can come to
an agreement to bind them all in a stable and
secure political society. The individuals who
come to contract together and join in a civil state
do not have to share the same race, ethnicity or
religion. They do not have to be pre-organized
in families or tribes, they are just relatively equal
individuals, who try to do what they judge is in
their best interest, and which will satisfy their
appetites. From this multitude of separate,
relatively independent individuals seeking their
12 Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History.
(New York, Viking, 2004); Christopher Hill, The
Century of Revolution, 1603-1714. (London: Routledge
Classics, 2002).
13 Hobbes, D.Cv. I.i.13, 118.
14 Hobbes, D.Cv., Dedication, 91; Leviathan, L.I.v.[6-8]), 24. 15  Hobbes, D.Cv. II.vi.1, 174.
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own preservation, Hobbes argues that we can
build a strong and stable political state.
Although it was revolutionary in the 17th
century, Hobbes’ conception of human nature
was taken up by Liberal political theorists in
the 18th and 19th centuries to exclude women
and to deny the legitimacy of strong social
institutions and to exclude those who were not
‘independent’ or equal from participation in
political life.16 Feminist theorists have been the
most persistent critics of the liberal conception
of human nature. The classic account of the
feminist critique of the liberal conception of
human nature and its relation to liberal political
theory is Alison Jaggar’s Feminist Politics and
Human Nature.17 Jaggar argued persuasively
that the liberal conception of human nature,
including its supposedly Hobbesian provision
that individuals are normative egoists,
determines the limited conception of political
obligation of liberal theory. If individual humans
can only be obliged to do those things in their
self-interest, then the list of duties to others is
going to be fairly minimal. Jaggar argues that
this ‘thin’ conception of human nature
engenders skepticism about social obligations.
Iris Young seconds Jaggar’s assessment that the
liberal conception of human nature is
inadequate for political theory and for projects
of empowerment, since it poorly describes
individual behavior, it is normatively inadequate
and misleading; thus, it hampers our social
imagination.18 Young argues that ‘bad’ social
ontology, particularly social atomism and
methodological individualism as practiced by
distributive (sometimes identified as
aggregative) democratic theorists, masks the
importance of social group and other social
relations which impinge upon individuals in
ways that are important and relevant for claims
of justice. Young writes,
The social ontology underlying many
contemporary theories of justice is
methodologically individualist or atomist. It
presumes that the individual is ontologically
prior to the social. This individualist social
ontology usually goes together with a normative
conception of the self as independent. The
authentic self is autonomous, unified, free, and
self-made, apart from history and affiliation,
choosing its life plan for itself.19
Such theorists, according to Young, are
in the grip of a false picture of human nature
and social life, where individuals are seen as
separate, rational, and with a certain share of
goods. This conception of the human individual
as separate, independent, ideally rational (and
consequently impartial), motivated by the self-
interested accumulation of goods underwrites
aggregative democracy theorists’ methodological
individualism and exclusive focus on distribution
of goods as matters of justice. Because of their
narrow conception of human nature, liberal
theorists then cannot accept social groups in their
ontology and cannot countenance the important
effects of social norms on individual behavior.20
Thus, we are trained as feminist theorists
to treat with suspicion any conception of human
nature, which appears to make individuals
separate, independent, self-interested and equal.
I agree wholeheartedly that the conception of
human nature as developed by Liberals in the
18th and 19th century is too thin to support the
kind of social obligations and institutions that
any decent society requires. However, I want to
distinguish Hobbes’ conception of human nature
from that of later theorists, since Hobbes gives
us a richer account of human motivation than
views of him as a normative egoist would suggest.
AGAINST NORMATIVE EGOISM
I began this paper noting that Hobbes is a
somewhat hated figure in the history of
philosophy. He is hated most vehemently not for
his advocacy of a strong sovereign, but primarily
16 MacPherson, C.B.  The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 and Den Uyl,
Douglas and Stuart Warner, “Liberalism and Hobbes and
Spinoza.” Studia Spinozana Volume 3: Spinoza and
Hobbes. (Alling: Walther & Walther Verlag, 1987).
17 Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature.
(Rowman and Littlefield, 1988).
18 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 228.
19 Justice and the Politics of Difference, 45.
20 Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Summer,
1977), 336, 342.
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for the position in ethics known as ‘Hobbesian’
or normative egoism.21 ‘Normative Egoism’ is the
principle that whatever we believe to be in our
self-interest is justified. It is usually joined to the
corollary: only that which is in an individual’s
self interest is obligatory. To be a normative
egoist requires accepting the following two
propositions:
1) that humans strive to do whatever they think
will preserve themselves,
2) that this is the best way to act.
Although Hobbes affirms 1), he argues
explicitly against 2). Hobbes believes that the
best way for people to act is according to ‘right
reason’; however, he writes that there are any
number of perturbations which can cloud right
reason.22 Hobbes and Spinoza share this view
that humans strive to preserve themselves. The
power or characteristic motion with which
individuals preserve themselves is understood as
‘conatus’ for both Hobbes and Spinoza. However,
neither thinks that individuals striving alone
following their appetites are preserving
themselves in the best way. Unlike liberal or
libertarian theorists who argue that individuals
following only their self interest yields the best
possible outcome for the collective, Hobbes
thought that each individual following their
desires characterizes the state of nature where
life would be nasty, brutish, and short.23 The state
of nature, for Hobbes, is the worst possible state
for human beings.24 Only by leaving the state of
nature and giving up their right to judge what
was best for them and to do what they thought
best, could individuals gain the security necessary
for any kind of flourishing life.
Hobbes is no liberal, nor does he take
humans to be ideally rational; however, his
conception of human nature and his conception
of political obligation are based on a similar
picture of humans as naturally2 separate and
seeking self-preservation (indeed, the liberal
conception of self-interest is derived from
Hobbes’ and Grotius’ formulation of the principle
of self-preservation). Hobbes does not believe
that social groups are natural and so his theory
would appear to number among those Young
finds useless for any feminist empowerment
project. However, even though Hobbes argues
against the naturalness of social groups, he can
account for the power of social norms and
obligations on individuals through his theory of
the emotions.
Hobbes formulation of his theory of the
contract, where unattached, separate individuals,
individually judge what is best for them, was a
radical alternative to naturalized social
hierarchies in his own time.25 His account offers
on the one hand a critique of Aristotelian-feudal
ideas of a natural hierarchy of classes and persons
such that men justly ruled women, nobles justly
ruled peasants, etc; on the other hand, a critique
of those skeptics who argued that there could be
no possible just political order, given the bloody-
minded and anti-social nature of human beings.
Hobbes’ account focuses on individual
human ‘power’ – a notion that is lost in later
liberal theories. Hobbes theoretical connection
of legitimacy and power makes his account
incredibly valuable for any empowerment
project, particularly one trying to understand the
power of social emotions on individuals. Despite
its apparent emaciation or thinness, Hobbes’
subject creates the foundations of a robust theory
of human power and human emotions. Hobbes
reconstructs the problem of political stability as
a problem of the organization of the multitude
of individuals that make up the state, particularly
the organization of their emotions. From this
essential Hobbesian foundation Spinoza will
21 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford : Clarendon
Press, 1962.); Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and
Human Nature. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld,
1983).
22 Hobbes, De Homine, xii, 55-56.
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.xiii [9], 76.
24 Edwin Curley, “I durst not write so boldly’,” in Hobbes
e Spinoza: scienza e politica. Daniela Bostrenghi, (ed.),
(Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992).
25 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political
Thought, Volume Two: The Age of Reformation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978; Q.
Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); U. Goldenbaum,
“Sovereignty and Obedience,” in Desmond Clarke and
Catherine Wilson, (eds.) Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
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build a theory of human empowerment which
will take as basic the idea that social forces
(which act on individuals through their
emotions) can increase and decrease individuals
power, depending on whether they are active or
passive, based on joy or sadness, respectively.
Because Hobbes’ ‘thin’ conception of
human nature has been taken up by liberals and
then by rational choice theorists for relatively
nefarious purposes, we completely lose the
context of Hobbes’ original formulation. From
the meager foundation of equal individuals
desiring things and trying to obtain what they
want (whatever that may be), without assuming
people were naturally good or evil, Hobbes
argued that we could derive the basis of a stable
state. Although Hobbes’ conception of human
nature has been called ‘thin’, it was not without
content. Hobbes conceives the human individual
as passionate, endowed both with an ability to
find the best means to obtaining its individual
needs and desires (reason) and also an ability to
critique and to evaluate these needs and desires
(right reason).
Hobbes’ exploration of the ways that
individuals’ passions and desires shape their
actions was systematic, taking individuals and
their passions to be made up of matter and
motions, and as such was of enormous
importance to Spinoza. If state stability depended
on the organization of the passions of the
individuals within it, then the passions of those
individuals must be understood.  Hobbes’
conception of human nature seems quite ‘thin’,
assuming very little about human sociability, or
human psychology. While feminists’ have long
critiqued this notion of a theoretically thin liberal
subject, Hobbes’ conception of human nature
offers something valuable to the project of
empowerment. The simplicity of his account
masks his insights into human emotions and their
role in motivating individual human actions on
the one hand and coordinating the actions of a
multitude of individuals on the other.
THE HOBBESIAN INDIVIDUAL
Although Spinoza’s theory of the human
affects have been celebrated, philosophers whose
primary interest is in Spinoza’s development of
this naturalistic view occasionally note his debt
to Hobbes, but rarely explore Hobbes’ theory of
the emotions and the human individual in
detail.26 Moreover, persistent misreading of
Hobbes as a normative egoist and as one of the
fathers of the thin ‘liberal conception of human’
have blocked attempts to understand Hobbes’
real contribution to a naturalistic conception of
human nature. Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s shared
naturalism meant that instead of deriding human
emotions and heaping criticism on the body, they
would try to understand the body and its
emotions as part of the natural world.
In what follows I will offer an interpretation
of Hobbes’ contribution: his conception of what I
will call the ‘affective machine’.27 Hobbes was the
first philosopher in modern times to propose a
fully corporeal or materialist conception of human
beings. Before Spinoza, Hobbes was a vocal and
public critic of Descartes’ dualism. Hobbes aimed
to explain human individuals both as physical
bodies and as the components of the civil state.
Hobbes proposed a conception of the
human individual as a being with a kind of
internal scale, on which appetite and aversion
are weighed. For Hobbes, the human (and
animal) body is an affective machine moving
alternately towards and away from those things
we desire or fear.28 For every potential action,
consciously or unconsciously, the affective-
emotional stakes are internally weighed. If
appetite outweighs aversion, the act is
completed. If aversion outweighs appetite, the
action is omitted or avoided. Hobbes defines this
internal weighing of appetite and aversion as
‘deliberation’.29
As we venture into the world following
our strongest affects, we gain experience.
Through this affective experience we learn which
of our appetites and aversion lead us to felicitous
26 An important exception to this is Susan James’ Passion
and Action: emotions in 17th century philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).
27 Those familiar with Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘desiring
machine’ idea will note parallels to Hobbes’ affect-
machine. Deleuze’s work on Spinoza and Freud yield
his conception of the desiring machine presented in
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
28  Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.vi, 27-28.
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, LI.vi [49], 33.
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outcomes. Whichever one wins out, appetite or
aversion, Hobbes defines as an individual’s will.30
Rejecting and deflating the Aristotelian notion
of the will as ‘rational appetite’, Hobbes’ will is
merely the last appetite that tipped the scales
toward action; it is shared by humans and other
beasts.31 This scale tips sometimes towards, and
sometimes against ‘reason’.32
Hobbes even understands reason
naturalistically and mechanistically, as a kind
of subroutine within the affective or ‘emotional’
machine. Affects provide a short-hand guide
to what ends serve the individual best, though
they may be unreliable. Over time, the individual
learns about what is actually better or worse for
them.33 Given a specific end, reason suggests the
best means to follow, and can be understood as
a kind of program which inputs ends and outputs
means. Right reason is a constraint on the reason
program, that after sufficient experience,
suggests better ends for the individual. Hobbes
understands right reason as what is actually best
for us, rather than just what we feel is better.
Right reason is best understood as an ‘end-
evaluator’; one that becomes better over time,
given the experience of the individual. Spinoza
takes up Hobbes’ view of the role of reason as
strengthened through experience and as reliant
on the affects.
From his affect-machine view of human
individuals, Hobbes builds a political theory and
argues for a conception of sovereign power strong
enough to coordinate these affect-machines. When
we understand Hobbes’ notion of the individual
as continually moved by a process of internal
weighing of appetite and aversion we can
understand Hobbes’ state of nature and his
conception of the sovereign properly.
THE STATE OF NATURE
Writing in the wake of the 16th century
wars of religion and in the midst of the English
Civil War, Hobbes understood first-hand how
religious division could cause violence and
undermine the social and political order.  He
worried that the Aristotelian basis of the political
state, the so-called natural sociability of humans,
could no longer be counted upon as a firm
foundation for political stability. The many and
conflicting sources of value that had previously
determined individual behavior – religion, social
hierarchies, political institutions – were no longer
aligned. The stability of the feudal hierarchies
in which duty to God could be satisfied without
conflicting with one’s social or political duties
had been dissolved by the wars of religion on
the Continent and the Civil War in England. To
ensure stability and avoid war, Hobbes argued
that these separate sources of norms and values
had to be organized under one single power, the
sovereign. Thus, ensuring the stability of the
sovereign was the primary responsibility of
political theory. For this task, Hobbes argues we
need to understand the parts that make up the
state, to wit, the individuals within it. To
understand politics, we need to understand the
multitude of individuals, their power, their
emotions, what motivates them and what leads
them astray. The strong state is one in which the
power of this multitude can be oriented toward
the ends of the state, freed from the multifarious
fears of the state of nature.
The Hobbesian conception of the state of
nature is a state without natural connections,
where individuals live in mutual fear of one
another.34 Hobbes argues that that this fear arises
from their natural equality, and their equal right
to preserve themselves.35 Each individual in the
state of nature has the right to do whatever is in
their power and whatever they judge necessary
to preserve their lives.36 This equal natural right
that each individual has to whatever will preserve
their lives, and their equal strength in mind and
body37 do not lead to peace, but rather are the
causes of this war.
Life in Hobbes’ state of nature is famously
“fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroyed
of all that Pleasure, and Beauty of life.”38 But
30 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.xiv, [49-53], 33.
31 Hobbes argues against the Scholastic understanding
of the will as ‘rational appetite’ in Leviathan, L.I.vi,
[53], 33.
32 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.vi, [53], 33.
33 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.v.[1-2], 22.
34 Hobbes, D.Cv.I.i.2, 113.
35 Hobbes, D.Cv. I.i.2-3, 113-114.
36 Hobbes, D.Cv I.i.7-8, 115-116.
37 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.xviii.[1], 74.
38 Hobbes, D.Cv.I.i.13, 118.
19REVISTA Conatus - FILOSOFIA DE SPINOZA - VOLUME 7 - NÚMERO 13 - JULHO 2013
TUCKER, ERICKA. SPINOZA’S HOBBESIAN NATURALISM AND ITS PROMISE FOR A FEMINIST THEORY OF POWER. P. 11-23.
why is it so? For Hobbes, the state of nature is
an emotionally challenging position for the
fragile human affect-machine. As each individual
attempts to deliberate, weighing their desires
against their fears, acting on whatever tips the
internal scales one way or another, the state of
nature presents a calculation problem that is
particularly difficult. In the state of nature,
individuals do not have coordinated affects. They
each feel and desire according to their internal
weighing of appetite and aversion. The unique
experiences of each individual create habits,
affective subroutines, even rational subroutines,
which are in principle different for each. Every
individual has reason to fear each of the others
in the state of nature. Each individual’s internal
processes of weighing alternatives is bound to
try to weigh the potential danger of each and
every other individual for each move one wishes
to make. Jean Hampton has famously argued that
Hobbes’ state of nature is akin to a multiple-
iteration prisoners’ dilemma.39 In fact, the
problem of action is much more difficult for the
denizens Hobbes’ state of nature. The
calculations are much more complicated, and
involve the potential actions of not just one but
all the other individuals in the same anarchic
state. The decision problem the individual in the
state of nature faces is much more like a
‘travelling salesman’ problem that a prisoners’
dilemma. Even, and perhaps, especially the agent
who has more information has little room for
making a rational decision.40 When one has to
take into consideration fear of all the other
individuals in the state of nature, the calculations
of appetite and aversion become overwhelming
and uncertain. In brief, the state of nature throws
the internal scales of the individual out of
balance, leaving the will effectively paralyzed.
For Hobbes, the uncertainty of such
arrangements is enough to undermine them. The
reasonable fear of all which characterizes the
state of nature overwhelms the individuals’
internal affective scales. For each appetite, the
individual has to weigh the fear of the other
individuals in the state of nature. This fear of other
equal individuals acts as a constant pressure on
the individual. For each action the individual
contemplates, they must fear the incursion of the
multitude of others whose desires may overlap.
Such a calculation is impossible, so the individual
will either be paralyzed or choose non-optimally.
There is no upper boundary to this fear of what
others might do, what others might want. Reason
cannot calculate the best decision. Thus, Hobbes
argues, reason teaches us to leave the state of
nature as soon as possible.41
No decision made in this state can lead to
an individuals’ best or to felicitous conditions
other than the collective decision to leave it. The
‘fear of all’ leads to violence or inability to use
one’s power and right to preserve themselves.
Flourishing is impossible in a situation where one
has reason to fear that nothing one accomplishes
will last. Because living in a state of nature where
one has reason to fear all is untenable, Hobbes
believes that dissatisfaction with the state of
nature will lead individuals to give up their right
and equality in order to find peace in the civil
state. To do so, he argues they must contract
among one another to give their power and will
over to the sovereign.42 This much is familiar.
However, let us return to the image of the
Hobbesian individual’s internal scale.
Joining the civil state with such a powerful
sovereign is, for Hobbes, a way to realign the
emotions, to recalibrate the internal emotional
scales. No longer does the individual in the civil
state have to fear every individual around them.
The fear that binds them together with the other
individuals is the fear of the sovereign and the
fear of breaking the sovereign’s law. The
sovereign must make its laws good and well
known,43 but above all enforced with a power to
keep the multitude in check.  Entering the civil
state, individuals trade an overwhelming and
uncertain fear of all for a fear of a much more
manageable sort. One can fear the sovereign and
still organize a life plan. No such planning is
possible in the state of nature.
39 Jean Hampton, Hobbes And The Social Contract
Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986).
40 Paul Weirich, Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for
Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 128-130.
41 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.xiv [4-7], 80.
42 Emphasis mine. Hobbes, Leviathan, L.I.xiv [4-7], 80-
81.
43 Hobbes, Leviathan, L.II.xxvi [3-4], 173.
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THE SOVEREIGN
The picture of Hobbes’ individual as an
‘affective-machine’ can also help us understand
the role of the sovereign in the civil state. Because
the internal affective scales of the individual are
tipped by stronger affects, the legislator or
sovereign must understand human appetites in
order to design penalties for the law which are
strong enough to ‘tip the scales’ for each individual
in favor of following the law. Hobbes writes,
“For the end of punishment is not to compel
the will of man, but to fashion it, and to make
it such as he would have it who hath set the
penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but
a weighing, as it were in scales, the
conveniences and inconveniences of the deed
we are attempting; where that which is more
weighty, doth necessarily according to its
inclination prevail within us. If therefore
the legislator doth set less penalty on a crime,
than will make our aversion more considerable
with us than our appetite, that excess of
appetite above the fear of punishment,
whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed
to the legislator, that is to say, to the supreme
power.” 44
The civil state frees the individual from
the paralyzing fear of uncertainty. The civil state
creates security, in that the individuals in the
civil state no longer have one another to fear.
They must fear the sovereign. However, Hobbes
makes it clear that what they need to fear in the
civil state is much less onerous than their fear in
the state of nature.
By reevaluating Hobbes’ conception of
human nature and his political theory through
the lens of his theory of emotions and what
Spinoza develops from Hobbes, we can make
better sense of the role of fear in the state of
nature, and the reformed role of fear in the state.
Hobbes’ sovereign delivers the multitude from
an intractable and overwhelming fear of others.
As soon as they join together and have a common
power above them, these individuals are no
longer enemies but fellow citizens, living together
in a peaceful commonwealth, guaranteed by the
overwhelming power of the sovereign, a power
necessary to guarantee the security of the law.
Hobbes’ conception of the role of
corrective fear also provides a mechanism for
Spinoza’s idea that a harmful ‘affect’ must be
fought with an equal and opposite affect.
Although Spinoza developed Hobbes’ notion of
the conatus more fully,45 both understand the
conatus as the source of individual motivation
to explore the world, as connected to the
individuals’ appetites and aversions, and as
capable of becoming more coherently organized,
and thus more powerful. The power of an
individual is increased through experience of the
world. Experience of the world is affective; one
learns from interactions with the world what
yields pain and pleasure, which desires are
frustrated and which are not.
We seek what we feel is best, and over
time, we get better at predicting what will make
us feel better. Both Hobbes and Spinoza agree
that there is an important distinction between
what we feel ‘preserves us’ and what preserves
us in the best way.46 Sometimes we may need to
change an affect that is bad for us. Hobbes’
conception of the individual as an affect-machine
shows how changing an existing affect or
affective subroutine requires an ‘equal and
opposite’ affective force to tip the internal scales.
Further, Hobbes’ political theory shows how the
state can provide the mechanism for such ‘scale-
tipping’. Spinoza’s political theory rests on the
Hobbesian notion that coordinating the affects
of the multitude is the main responsibility of the
sovereign, and that political institutions have to
be built with the aim of coordinating and
motivating individuals’ affects. However, Spinoza
differed from Hobbes in his eventual evaluation
of fear as a motivator. Although Spinoza moves
beyond Hobbes’ account, his critique of Hobbes’
is very much an internal one.
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF SPINOZA
In the last ten years there has been an
increasing interest in Spinoza’s Ethics and
44 Hobbes, D.Cv.II.xiii, 16, 269.
45 E. Tucker, “Affective Disorders of the State,” “The Affective
Disorders of the State,” Journal of East-West Thought, Special
Issue: Crimes Against Humanity and Cosmopolitanism.
Volume 3, No. 2, Summer, 2013, 97-120.
46 Spinoza, Political Treatise in Shirley (2002), Political
Treatise, TP 5.1, 698-699; Ethics, E4Prop52, 347; L.I.vi,
26-27; D.H. xi.4, 47, D.H. xii.4, 56-58.
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political philosophy in feminist philosophy
circles. In particular, feminist theorists have
prized Spinoza’s theory of the affects and the
imagination, his conception of ‘conatus’, and the
social and political theory he builds from these.
Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd’s pioneering
work Collective Imaginings (1999) presents
Spinoza as ‘the road not taken’ in the history of
philosophy and as an important source for a non-
dualistic understanding of human nature. These
philosophers mine Spinoza’s work for a set of
tools to build a non-reductive embodied account
of ethics which can be used to understand and
properly theorize human power, responsibility
and freedom. In the introduction to Feminist
Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza,47 Gatens
surveys the many ways that feminist philosophers
have taken up Spinozan ideas, including: “using
Spinoza’s mind-body thesis to challenge the sex-
gender distinction, developing his views on
‘sensual love’ to question the grounds of
normative heterosexuality, and exploring the role
of the imagination in determining how
‘difference’ is configured.”48 In outlining the
elements of Spinoza’s philosophy that commend
him to contemporary philosophers, Gatens cites
“his commitment to an immanent, naturalistic
worldview that is amenable to the human
understanding through ‘scientific’ explanation.”49
Spinoza’s project to ‘embody and
naturalize ethics’ 50 opposes attempts by moral
philosophers (in our day and in his) to demean
the body and its affects, and to blame these for
moral failures. In my own work, I take up
Spinoza’s conceptions of individual power to
construct a theory of democracy in which
maximal inclusion and participation yield
empowered individuals and a stronger state.
However, in this feminist work on Spinoza (my
own included) there has been only passing
recognition of the influence of Hobbes’ on
Spinoza’s views. The tendency in the feminist
Spinoza scholarship is rather to distance him
from Hobbes. This is an understandable strategy,
given the persistent misinterpretations of Hobbes
and the understandable difficulty of imagining
that an early modern male philosopher would
have much to say to contemporary feminist
theory. It is strange enough that Spinoza could
provide feminists with tools to empower women,
but Hobbes? In this section, I will set out the
aspects of Spinoza’s naturalistic ethics that
feminist philosophers have found so promising:
Spinoza’s rejection of Cartesian dualism, his
theory of the affects, his conception of the
conatus, and the basics of the social and political
theory that he builds from this naturalized
conception of human individuals. I will then
show how these emerge from his reading of
Hobbes.
SPINOZA AND FEMINIST SPINOZISM
One of the most attractive aspects of
Spinoza’s philosophy has been his rejection of
Descartes’ dualism of mind and body, and the
related hierarchy of reason over emotion.
Feminist critiques of Descartes’ dualism and his
conception of mind are legion,51 so it is no
surprise that feminists would have found in
Spinoza’s “non-reductive psycho-physical
monism”52 an important alternative to Descartes.
Where the Cartesian subject is understood as
essentially rational, not primarily embodied,
Spinoza’s individual is interconnected with others,
primarily affective, and necessarily embodied. For
Spinoza, each human being derives his or her
power from Nature, of which each individual is a
47  Moira Gatens, Feminist Interpretations of Spinoza.
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2009).
48 Gatens (2009), 2.
49 Gatens (2009), 2.
50 Heidi Ravven, “What Spinoza can Teach us About
Embodying and Naturalizing Ethics,” in Gatens (2009).
51 Naomi Scheman, “Though This Be Method, Yet There
Is Madness in It: Paranoia and Liberal Epistemology”
in J. Kourany, ed. The Gender of Science. (New York:
Prentice Hall, 2001); Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics
and Human Nature. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1983); Genevieve Lloyd (1984) The Man of
Reason. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984); Young, Iris Marion. “Equality of Whom? Social
Groups and Judgments of Injustice.” The Journal of
Political Philosophy. (Volume 9, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-
18); Susan Bordo (1987) The Flight to Objectivity.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1987; Peter Lindsay, “The
‘Disembodied Self’ in Political Theory.” Philosophy and
Social Criticism, (Vol. 28, No. 2, 2002), 191-211.
52 Heidi Ravven, “Spinozistic Approaches to Evolutionary
Naturalism: Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary
affective neuroscience.” Politics and the Life Sciences
(Vol. 22, no. 1, March 2003), 70.
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part. Spinoza’s affect theory, and the social and
political theories follow from this.53
Spinoza understands the human individual
as a complex of parts. 54 Different forces in the
world affect each of an individual’s parts in
divergent ways.55  Each individual is pulled in
different directions by these different parts,
which are experienced as conflicting desires
pulling one toward different actions. 56 To
coordinate these parts, to organize these desires
is an achievement which increases the
individual’s power. In Spinoza’s view we come
into the world with rather confused appetites,
which can conflict and which can pull the body
in different direction, acting on the different parts
of the body. Without a way to coordinate and
prioritize affects and desires, an individual would
follow their strongest affect at any given time,
and would be pulled this way and that by external
forces. To unify the conflicting affects, individuals
must construct a notion of a ‘self’, an imaginative
construction which organizes the desires. Only
by developing a conception of the ‘self’, which
can organize and prioritize appetites through
understanding what actually increases one’s
power, can one actually increase one’s power.57
The development of a coherent notion of the self
is one that parallels one’s understanding of the
world and what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for one, a
process that for most occurs within the context
of a social world where what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’
are already determined. For Spinoza, selves are
not created in a vacuum, but in a social world.
SPINOZA’S DEBT TO HOBBES
Spinoza’s mature account of the power
of the affects provides a promising naturalistic
foundation for projects of empowerment;
however, in its early versions, Spinoza’s
conception of what he then called ‘the passions’
was not particularly consonant with naturalism
at all.58
In his early work Spinoza’s conception of
the affects was highly intellectualized. In The
Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being59
Spinoza’s account of the affects, or as he is calling
them at this point, ‘the passions’, are caused by
opinion, a variety of knowledge. However, this
intellectual theory of the passions left Spinoza
with a problem: if a passion was based on an
opinion or a mistaken idea, then learning the
truth should make the passion disappear or
change. However, certain passions survived
countervailing evidence. Spinoza does not yet
have the theoretical resources to explain why
some passions are so strong and seemingly
impenetrable by reason. Further, in these early
works, Spinoza recognizes the importance of
increasing the power of those around us and
trying to get them to improve their minds and
to love God.60 However, if an individual
committed to the difficult path of reason has
trouble overcoming passions, how could we
expect the multitude to ever follow reason? The
question of how to shape the affects of the
multitude so that they would not be so easily
swayed by divisive and violent passions became
urgent for Spinoza in the 1660s. Political events
in the Netherlands61 forced Spinoza to come up
with a solution to his ‘passion’ problem. Sensing
the danger to free thought and to his own work,
in 1665, Spinoza put aside his work on the
53 Although my account is consonant with and indebted
to those feminist philosophers who have taken up
Spinoza’s work as promising for feminism (Gatens and
Lloyd, Lloyd, Ravven, Sharp),  the precise formulation
of Spinoza’s theory of the affects, and his social and
political theory here is my own.
54 Spinoza, Ethics, E3Prop51, 303-304; E2P13L7S [Postulates
I-VI], 251-255.
55 Spinoza, Ethics, E3Prop17S, 287-288.
56 Spinoza, Ethics, E4Prop33, 295.
57 Heidi Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative
History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth
of Free Will. The New Press, 2013.
58 Susan James, Passion and Action: Emotions in 17th
century philosophy. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); Amy
M. Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century Theories of
Emotions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/
entries/emotions-17th18th/>
59 Spinoza began work on the Short Treatise in 1660
(Spinoza, 2002, xviii) and was finished with it by 1665,
probably earlier, since he is already focused on other
projects by 1662.
60 Spinoza, Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect in
Shirley (2002), TIE [14-16], 6.
61 Israel, Jonathan. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness
and Fall, 1477-1806. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998).
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Ethics62 and began writing the Theological-
Political Treatise in which he hoped to show, “that
freedom of philosophizing” was consistent both
with peace and piety, and that if such freedom
were denied both peace and piety would be at
risk.63
While in the middle of wrestling with
these issues, the Latin collected works of Hobbes
were printed in Amsterdam.64 In the Latin works,
particularly De Corpore and De Homine, Hobbes
sets out the details of his materialist theory of
the emotions. In the Leviathan he brings them to
bear on the politics. Spinoza would have found
Hobbes’ work immediately useful for his own
projects: namely, how to understand and control
the affects of the multitude. Hobbes’ thoroughly
materialist theory of individual and collective
affects integrated with a material conception of
political power provided the answers Spinoza
sought. Only after reading Hobbes’ materialist
conception of the affects did Spinoza develop
his mature theory, first seen in the final chapters
of the Theological-Political Treatise and developed
more fully in the final five-part version of the
Ethics and in the Political Treatise. Hobbes’
theory of the affects, although it has been
underappreciated in our time, was of enormous
significance for Spinoza, and it helped Spinoza
develop his uniquely useful theory of human
power.
NORMS AND EMPOWERMENT
Spinoza’s naturalistic understanding of
the body and of the imagination provides a
blueprint for human empowerment. Through
understanding the forces in the natural world
which affect us and by reforming our imaginative
pictures of the world to become more adequate
we can increase our power. Society can help us
increase our power, since by joining with others
with whom we agree can allow us to join our
power with theirs, allowing us to do more and
to understand more than we could ever do alone.
However, joining with others also means sharing
an imaginative view of the world that may not
be entirely adequate and thus may not be best
for us.
Our affective lives, and hence our ability
to be free, are caught within forces, made up
only of individuals and their affects, but which
form and are formed by institutions, customs,
practices. Social norms become like physical
forces within each individual member of a society
who has either been trained up in these norms
or who lives in the society long enough to feel
their force. Community norms are based on
shared passion and passions are not necessarily
based on reason.65 So, for Spinoza, social customs
based on passions might not be best for us. We
have more than enough experience to show that,
for women, social norms and customs may not
always yield empowerment or freedom.
Spinoza argued that reason alone, that is,
understanding what is best for us, is not enough
to overcome those affects that are reinforced by
experience.66 Since we live in society most of our
affects are shaped by communal norms and
practices. Not all community norms and practices
are necessarily what’s ‘best’ for those in the
community. So the individual in such a
community seeking what is best for them may
come to dissent from certain community norms
and practices. However, the power of a single
individual is small in relation to an affectively
united community. Just as the individual must
fight ‘affects with affects’ to reform his or her
individual passions, so to unseat harmful
community norms and practices one must use
‘affects to fight affects’. Although Spinoza
proposes this solution, it is Hobbes who gives us
the mechanism for understanding how affects
might be fought with affects.
k k k
62 This early version of The Ethics was in 3 parts and we
have reason to believe retained the intellectualist
conception of the passions of the Short Treatise. It
probably contained a similar structure to the Short
Treatise, and had sections on God, Improving the Mind
and Freedom.
63 Theological-Political Treatise in Shirley (2002), 387.
64 Bibliotheek van het Spinoza Huis. Catalogus van de
Bibliotheek der Vereniging het Spinozahuis te Rijnsburg.
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965).
65 Spinoza, Ethics, E4Prop37S, 339-340
66 Spinoza, Ethics, E4Prop1, 323; Spinoza, Short Treatise,
in Shirley, (ed.) Complete Works, (New York: Hackett,
2002), Ch. 21, 92-93
